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τοιοῦντες? 125 πανουργότατον λόγον for κακουργότατον?

Philippic I. 10 'λέγεταί τι καινόν'; γένοιτ' ἄν τι καινότερον κ.τ.λ.; I do not feel sure that we should not read λέγοιτ' ἄν for γένοιτ' ἄν. The parts of γίγνομαι and λέγομαι certainly interchange; sometimes both appear as various readings in MSS.

H. RICHARDS.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE INTERJECTION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENTENCE.

I. IN the following paper I propose to show that the fundamental type of sentence consists of a vocative and an imperative, that the vocative and imperative forms are primitive, and that they are derived from the interjection. If my attempt is successful, it will be necessary to revise and even to recast the traditional scheme of grammar.

The Report of the Joint Committee on Grammatical Terminology presents in the clearest possible form the outlines of grammar as understood by English scholars of to-day. It has seemed best therefore to offer what I have to say, in the form of a criticism upon their report. It may save misunderstanding further if I admit that I do not regard language simply as an expression of thought but as an expression of the whole personality. This is really the main point at issue.

I have not been so unreasonable as to suppose that the committee were blind to the obvious facts with which I have to deal, and therefore I have tried to give them credit for an amount of sympathy which does not appear on the surface of their report. Perhaps the tone of my paper may seem offensive. The size of the committee must be my excuse. The virtues of a committee are usually in inverse ratio to its size.

When Horace asked the question: *ridentem dicere verum quid vetat?* he appealed to the example of the Roman teachers of Latin who, we are told, handed buns round in order to relieve the monotony of Latin grammar. Now although Horace uses the plural, *doctores*, it must be understood that the distribution of buns was made by the individual teacher and not by the Roman committee on *elementa prima*. When, therefore, Lucilius said: *gustavi crustula solus*, we must suppose that he had a teacher all to himself. But laughter, as Sterne says, 'adds something to our fragment of life,' and is therefore better than a bun. If it is impossible to combine the statement of grammatical principles with amusement, I must throw up my hands, and confess that, on my interpretation of the facts of language, there is room for an occasional chuckle.

II. The current method of Latin grammar is based upon the logical analysis of written expression. I say Latin grammar, because in what follows we shall be mainly concerned with Latin. But this will not prevent us from getting light from Greek and English grammar, and to be quite candid from throwing a little light upon both English and Greek grammar. The reader may think this promise somewhat presumptuous, and, indeed, I should not have ventured upon it, if I had not felt that the Joint Committee on Grammatical Terminology in their report had not given sufficient place to language as expressing impulse and emotion. On p. 15 the decree goes forth 'that sentences be classified as follows in all the five languages: statements, questions, and the expressions of desire.' Exclamations are relegated to a note and are limited to a certain class of sentences: 'Those introduced by pronouns, adjectives, or adverbs, which in other contexts are either interrogative or relative, but are here exclamatory.'

However admirable the Latin grammar (as understood by the committee) may be, it does not cover the whole of the ground; it does not account adequately for the phenomena of *oral* expression. We are compelled therefore to go further afield, and in doing so we

light at once upon a considerable number of fresh facts. And these facts group themselves round the interjection. Quite independently of my preparations for this paper, I came across a striking passage in Tylor's *Primitive Culture* (I^3, 176). 'The philologist's concern with [interjections] is to study their action in expressing emotion, and to trace their passage into more fully formed words.' The whole of Dr. Tylor's chapters on emotional and imitative language may be referred to as a foundation for the argument which follows.

We must begin by facing the question fairly: what is the object to which grammarians direct themselves? Do they mean written language or spoken language? To this I reply that all language properly so-called is to be regarded as spoken. It is only by an accident that it comes to be written. Language therefore is *oral* expression. And we should remind ourselves, on the one hand, that much oral expression is incapable of being reduced to writing, and, on the other hand, that much writing which passes for language is nothing of the kind.

III. But oral expression is only one form of human expression. A true workman expresses himself in his work, as do the engineers who keep our great steamships going, and so on. It throws the whole subject of grammar out of key if we confine ourselves to written language and to statements and questions which, as the committee say, correspond to logical judgments.

IV. I am glad that the committee referred to logical *judgments*. They are evidently conscious that grammar cannot be understood entirely from within itself. And in their wish to get help they have had recourse to psychology. For, although Kant has said that there is no such science as psychology, he has been confuted by the history of that science. And I am encouraged to fall back upon my own limited knowledge of psychology by the example of the committee. We shall not treat human beings therefore simply as giving rise to articulate sounds which can be reduced to order with the help of the logician. Now, since the majority of the readers of the *Classical Review* are scarcely likely to know so much psychology as the committee, I will warn them of their danger lest they should fall into a dreadful heresy which is known as the 'faculty psychology.' By this is meant that one separates thought from feeling, and both from will; as though you could conduct your thoughts without being influenced by feelings, and *vice versâ*; or as though you could either think or feel or act without at the same time doing something of all three.

V. Now it is because the committee are unlikely to have fallen into so obvious a mistake that I venture to carry out what, I am sure, must have been their intention. In their report on Grammatical Terminology they omitted to say very much about the oral expression of feeling, not because they overlooked the facts which I have stumbled upon, but because it is very difficult to get a committee to agree upon everything, and they felt that if we regarded grammar as mainly an exercise in the logical judgment, it was at least something. Most practical grammarians are uncomfortable in the presence of feeling and action; and after trying to make room in my own case for the expression of feeling and action, I am inclined to sympathise.

VI. At the same time we must not shrink from following out this topic somewhat further. If we are to be complete grammarians, we must study in a little detail the behaviour of human beings, so that we may understand the manner in which their behaviour finds expression in language. In particular, what is the stage at which man, as a matter of course, employs statements and questions which, as the committee says, correspond to logical judgments? This high estimate which the committee entertains of the human intellect came as somewhat of a shock to me, because I had always understood that by nature man was imperfectly equipped with reason, and that the use of Latin grammar in education was to supply this imperfection in the work of the Creator. Monsieur Anatole France has expressed a similar thought in his own incom-

parable way. He is looking back to the good old times. 'By learning Latin the pupils learnt something infinitely more precious than Latin. They learnt the art of directing and expressing their thought.' Now, although I cannot claim to have entered into the full possession of this heritage, it is obviously necessary that we should find a place in our scheme of human behaviour for that delightful attitude of mind which, owing to their study of Latin, the committee shares with Monsieur France. This we will call the attitude of *understanding*, expressed in statements and questions which correspond to logical judgments.

VII. But what is the typical attitude or attitudes of the great mass of mankind, including the skilful engineer and myself? At any rate we can use things for our own ends, even if we cannot reflect upon them very clearly. The engineer's vocabulary would perhaps illustrate the subject of this paper with more emphasis than would suit the pages of the report on Grammatical Terminology. But this could at least be said about him: he would be perfectly sincere. There would be no affectation of making statements which correspond to logical judgments. Without going into unnecessary detail, many engineers use interjections, vocatives, imperatives and other exclamations in the most vivid way. This is the primitive attitude of man contending with his surroundings and using such tools as come to hand. We can all reach, or pass through, this attitude. Hence we can now proceed to mark off two attitudes of man—first, that of *practice* or *use;* second, that of *understanding*.

VIII. It is difficult to make some people (especially those scientific men who have learnt Latin) understand that there is an experience higher than the formation of logical judgments. Mankind cannot be dismissed offhand into two classes: those who have learnt 'the art of directing and expressing their thought,' and those less fortunate ones who have not so learnt. There is a third attitude of man to other persons and things—namely, the attitude of *sympathy*. We no longer contemplate things and persons from the outside; we enter into their intentions and tendencies. Now it is quite possible to be deeply sympathetic, and yet to fail of that logical perfection towards which we are conducted by Latin grammar. Dr. Fennell, in his excellent edition of Pindar's *Odes*, was perplexed by the style of the poet, and delivered himself as follows: 'Most of the difficulties in Pindar's *Odes* arise from his rapidity and fulness of thought, which often seems to have made him sacrifice the formal expression of the connexion of his ideas.' This statement is not altogether clear, but I understand it to mean that Pindar's attitude to life was not one of calm understanding. For no state of mere understanding would make us 'sacrifice the formal expression of the connexion of our ideas.' On the contrary, where you have perfect understanding 'all is ordered luminous, simple.' I am quoting Monsieur France on Livy. 'Livy is not a profound genius; but he is a perfect pedagogue. He never moves us, and for that reason we read him without any keen pleasure. But how regularly he thinks! How pleased he is to show his thought, to examine all the pieces of it, and to explain the part which each of them plays!' I said to myself when I read this passage: 'There is a description of the committee on Grammatical Terminology.' At the same time, among the members of that committee, I recognise the names of several friends of mine whose knowledge of Pindar is much greater than any to which I can myself aspire. They are in the committee, but not entirely of it. They show that it is possible not only to utter sentences and questions which correspond to logical judgments, but to penetrate further into the heart of things, and to unveil the hidden things of the classical literatures. Neither understanding nor the absence of understanding is the key to this third form of apprehension, but a heart that vibrates in response to the eternal voices. At any rate, I can count upon their assent to the very modest proposition which I will lay down now as the main thesis of this paper: *the analysis of language from a logical standpoint does not account for all the forms of which grammar must take account*. Or, in other words, oral expression is organically related not only to thought, but to action and feeling.

IX. Some one may say, however, that the committee have made adequate provision for the expression of feeling, on p. 15, in their third category of *desire*. But for some reason or other they are careful to distinguish sentences expressing desire from exclamations, and therefore from the expression of feeling. I will confess that I do not understand the point of view of the committee. Surely the expression of desire involves the expression of feeling! Desires, we are told, include commands, requests, entreaties, wishes. From this it would appear that desires roughly answer to the use of the imperative mood. And this is the sense in which I shall take leave to understand the expression of desire. From our point of view we shall regard the imperative mood as an ejaculation, no less than the fourth form of sentence which is so regarded by the committee.

Curiously enough if we examine the exclamations which the committee separate from the other forms of sentence, they will be found to consist at the root in *nouns* used as ejaculations. *Que de fleurs! what nonsense!* ὦ *βάθος πλούτου κ.τ.λ.* There is reason to think that the verb in such phrases as *Ut perii* is no real exception. We may compare the phrase with *O me miserum!*

X. Now if we combine the imperative mood with the vocative, which is the simplest form of the noun used in ejaculations (that is, if we combine the committees 'expressions of desire' with their 'exclamation'), we arrive at a well-defined form of sentence: *Ave, Caesar; Lugete, o Veneres Cupidinesque; Quaere novum vatem, tenerorum mater amorum.* In English we have: *Blow, blow, thou winter wind; Go, lovely rose; Ruin seize thee, ruthless king;* and so on. Such sentences are the proper expression of feeling and action. They are specially characteristic of everyday life. Any one can satisfy himself of this by listening to the passers-by.

But I do not think it has been observed that this type of sentence is frequent enough in literature to demand special attention. I open by chance, *Every Man in his Humour.* The first words of the dialogue are:

> A goodly day toward! and a fresh morning!
> Brainworm,
> Call up young master. Bid him rise, Sir;
> Tell him I have some business to employ him.

Two interjections and then two sentences that begin the action of the play. Take a case where such sentences interrupt the current of ordinary statements. How beautifully, in the parabasis of the *Knights*, two such sentences occur! the prayers to Poseidon and Athena. We want a name for this sort of sentence. Perhaps the term *active* is as good as we can find. Such a sentence is more than a bare imperative: it is more than a bare vocative. There must be the combination of the noun and the verb. If we wanted a technical description, perhaps the term *judgment* would be convenient. Unfortunately the term judgment has been confined by the grammarians and logicians and psychologists to something which is not so much a judgment, as a theoretic opinion.

For to judge is more than to hold an opinion. When we judge we express both our feeling towards an event or person, and the demand which arises out of such a feeling.

We are prepared now to meet a striking fact. The Lord's Prayer is *exclusively* composed of active sentences or judgments. It begins with a vocative which is understood along with all the succeeding expressions of desire. In like manner the National Anthem illustrates throughout the type of sentence with which we are occupied.

In the distinction which we have thus established between the active and the theoretic sentences, we secure a touchstone of style. Of course, now that the distinction has been pointed out the writers of prize poems will doubtless take account of it. But it is interesting to thread one's way through the jungle of English hymns with this as a clue. Most of our fine hymns begin with an active sentence. Where, however, the first sentence is of the narrative form, the effect is rarely tolerable, unless the verb is one of prayer or praise. I cannot refrain from one instance of an obvious failure. The congregation is addressing God, and they begin with the tame state-

ment of the time: *The day is past and over!* I should like to think that a similar line of inquiry may lead, in the hands of abler critics, to important results in the classical literatures.

XI. I do not wish to pride myself unduly upon the discovery which was announced in the last paragraph. For the committee on Grammatical Terminology were only prevented from making it by their admirable but excessive devotion to the philosophy of Aristotle. They recommend on p. 8, 'that the first stage in the analysis of a sentence be to divide it into two parts, to be called the subject and the predicate.' For example: *The merciful man is merciful to his beast.* Here *is merciful to his beast* is the predicate and *the merciful man* is the subject. Now in the philosophy of Aristotle, the subject is regarded as the substrate of qualities, and the predicate is attached to this substrate. Aristotle frequently employs another turn of phrase. He says τὸ β ὑπάρχει τῷ α as well as τὸ α ἐστι τὸ β. If we paraphrase our typical sentence it will run: *The quality of being merciful to his beast* pertains to *the merciful man.* In other words, the analysis of the sentence into subject and predicate turns upon the Aristotelian conception of substance. Hence, what the committee speaks of as a sentence (p. 8) is really a theoretic opinion expressed in the form of Aristotelian logic. If only the committee could have shaken off the trammels of logic! Let the reader compare the beginning of my tenth section with the contents of the preceding section; he will see that I rightly acknowledged my indebtedness to p. 15 of the report. The committee describe Statements and Questions indeed in accordance with the rules of Aristotle (compare p. 8). But when they are left to themselves they describe Desires and Exclamations in such a way, that we only needed to combine the two in order to obtain the judgment proper or active sentence.

XII. We are now going to take the *active sentence* as the type to which other forms of sentence may be referred. We begin by discarding the term *subject* from grammar. There is no useful office performed by this word, which cannot be rendered by the term *person.* The *subject* of the verb is the *person* of the verb. And, if you say that a person is not a thing, and therefore it is ridiculous to describe gold as a person in the phrase *gold glitters,* I reply that gold is a person, just as much as *it,* in *it glitters,* is the third person. But, further, gold is masculine in Greek and French; French can say of gold, *il brille.* Our use of the word person, therefore, answers to the fact of gender, and is more appropriate to the genius of language than the philosophical term *substrate.* In English we have still the *ship* to remind us of the time when gender applied to English nouns. In other words, person throws us back upon the time when all language palpitated with life.

XIII. The term *predicate* must be dismissed along with the term *subject.* For we are told by the committee, on page 8, that sentences are to be analysed into subject and predicate. Strictly speaking, the term predicate κατηγορούμενον should be limited to *assertions.* Hence expressions of desire scarcely admit of predicates in the proper sense. What, for example, is the predicate in *Long live the King?* The committee answers, *Long live.* But this is not merely asserted, it is commanded, or prayed for. I shall not labour this point further, but shall go on to the fourth form of sentence—exclamations. *How true! Que de fleurs!* We are told that the adverbs are exclamatory. In that case we have a phrase consisting of an exclamation and a nominal form. Here then, at any rate, there is no predicate.

Let us turn back to the active sentence. This consists of a vocative and a verb, or, as we may now say, a person and a verb. Does the *verb* supply us with the term we want. I think it does. The verb denotes movement and change, together with their contradictories. Even in the verbs that express rest, the rest is not static but dynamic. For example, the verb *to be* is completed in some language from the verb to stand, and the standing implies standing firm, that is, against resistance.

In a word, the active sentence refers action and reaction to a personal agent. The term predicate implies the bare addition of a label to an imperfectly developed object of thought. Hence the active sentence is infinitely more frequent in daily life than the logical sentence.

XIV. We have thus seen reason to lay down another type of sentence than that to which the distinction of subject and predicate applies. The active sentence answers to the language of common life as distinguished from the language of reflection. For this latter the logical sentence is appropriate. Unfortunately the grammarians have tried to reduce the active sentence to this latter type. In so doing they have not only distorted the language of ordinary busy life: they have failed to do justice to the language of sympathy and the deeper emotions generally.

XV. This will involve a recasting of grammar in order to make it correspond more closely to the order of facts. I will conclude by a brief summary of the lines along which the grammar, first of the interjection, second of the verb, and then of the noun, requires to be reconsidered.

XVI. The interjection will come first in our grammar. Do you remember how in Rudyard Kipling's story, *The Man Who Was*, the returned officer was recognised by the vowel sound upon which his weeping was pitched? This may serve as a parable for us. There is a profounder vernacular than that of articulate language. Man weeps, laughs, snores, wonders, rejoices.

Nor is the menagerie silent. Our own *cockadoodledoo* does not correspond to life so closely as the *co co co co* of Petronius, nor is *baa baa black sheep* so realistic as the *be be* of Greek literature.

XVII. Then will come the parts of speech which are nearest to the interjection. In the verb we must follow the example of Mr. Magnus in the *Pickwick Papers*, and conjugate ourselves into the imperative mood. There is considerable evidence that this was a primitive form. *Lauda, mone, rege, audi* are both the stems of verbs and the second singular of the imperative *Vel* falls into its place as the imperative of *volo*. Compare the derivation of *if* from *gif*. The analogy of *vel* supports this derivation. *Dic, duc, fac, fer* help us to understand *vel;* the lack of the terminal vowel is due to the indeterminate character of the vowel which follows the stem in the third conjugation.

XVIII. The subjunctive is to be treated first as an ally of the imperative and ultimately of the interjection. *Benedicite* is paralleled by *benedicamus*. Where are we to draw the line as we conjugate *faciam, fac, faciat, faciamus, facite, faciant?* It is at this point, therefore, that the subjunctive must first enter our grammatical scheme. We must correct Roby therefore. 'The subjunctive mood,' he says, 'as distinguished from the indicative, expresses an action as thought or supposed, rather than as done or narrated.' The subjunctive is nearer than the indicative to the command, the interjection. It emphasises the will, the desire. Hence we contrast it as doing something, with the indicative which is the narrating of something. Nor can I accept without qualification the report on the *Terminology of Grammar*, xlii. The reference of the subjunctive to future time is only secondary; this reference arises from the imperative meaning which as we have seen, may be treated as primary. The committees quote the question: *quid faciam?* the reply should be *hoc age*. Certainly it would not run *hoc agere te oportebit.* The footnote of the committee is unfortunately phrased. The reference to the future is not intrinsic, but adventitious.

XIX. If we consider the example just given, we can see how the deliberative subjunctive arises out of the imperative. And from the deliberative there may come the use of the subjunctive in indirect questions. *Quid ab hac metuis? Quid ego metuam, rogitas.* 'Do you inquire what I *am to fear?*' We might regard this indirect question as an independent clause, and compare the whole phrase with such constructions as *quid mihi dicent, demiror* (Ter. *Ph.* 234).

XX. The beginnings of the final construction may be seen in such collocations as *cura valeas.* Such constructions are obviously to be treated as primary, and are not to be explained

by the omission of *ut*. They may be compared with phrases like *iures postulo*. The misunderstanding of these constructions is due to the undue postponement of the imperative in the scheme of grammar.

In the limits of this paper I can only suggest the derivation of the deliberative and the final subjunctive from the imperative. The reader can consider for himself how the subjunctive after relative pronouns and adverbs, and also the subjunctive in reported speech, may be traced back to the imperative. English will furnish a clue. Our own indirect speech shows relations with the imperative. Dr. Johnson is perplexed by the use of *should be* in reported speech, and quotes Bacon: 'There is a fabulous narration, that in the northern countries there *should be* an herb that groweth in the likeness of a lamb.' Compare an idiom still current: He is one who *should* know. *Est qui sciat.*

XXI. Turning to the noun, we shall at once be led to the vocative as the typical interjectional case, and as the nearest to the primitive form. Like the imperative, the vocative (where there is a form separate from the nominative) contains the stem. This is seen more clearly in Greek. Owing to the importance of the vocative, both actually in speaking and historically, it would seem appropriate to put it before the nominative.

XXII. The interjectional use of the dative is seen in phrases like *quid mihi Celsus agit?* Now it is probable that the case endings of personal pronouns are older than other case endings. Hence we will venture to argue from the form of *mihi*. The ending *-hi* is probably implosive—that is to say, a gasp. The whole group of endings, *-hi*, *-bi*, in Latin, and *-φι* in Greek, may be compared with the interjection, *fie*, and its cognates (*cf.* Sweet, *History of Language*, p. 35). It is tempting to imagine that the *i* which is common to all dative singulars in Latin was developed by analogy from *mihi*.

XXIII. I have offered these few illustrations of my main thesis, because they are fairly certain. To have gone further would unduly lengthen this paper.

FRANK GRANGER.

NOTES

THEOCRITUS, *IDYLL* XV. 112.

MSS.: *πὰρ μέν οἱ ὥρια κεῖται, ὅσα δρυὸς ἄκρα φέροντι.* Meineke points out that *μέν οἱ* is unmetrical, as the digammated *Fοι* should lengthen *μέν* by position, cp. 25. 82. His own suggestion *ὀπώρα* is, however, hardly convincing. Perhaps the original reading was—*πὰρ μὲν ὅσ' ὥρια κεῖται, ὅσα δρυὸς ἄκρα φέροντι*, 'Beside him lie the season's fruits, even all that the oak-sprays bear.' For the use of *ὅσος* as correlative to *ὅσος*, cp. *Idyll* IV. 39, *ὅσσον αἶγες ἐμὶν φίλαι, ὅσσον ἀπέσβας;* Oppian *Cyneg.* 4. 210 *ὅσσον χάδον ὅσσον ἔρεξαν.* The letter change in uncials is of course slight, and might arise through misunderstanding of the idiom.

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TERENCE, *EUNUCHUS*, 835-839.

PYTHIAS. Habemus hominem ipsum. THAIS. Ubi is est? PY. Em, ad sinisteram.
Viden? TH. Video. PY. Comprendi iube, quantum potest.
TH. Quid illo faciemus, stulta? PY. Quid facias rogas?
Vide amabo, si non, quom aspicias, os impudens
Videtur! TH. Non est? PY. Tum quae eius confidentiast!

So these lines are given in Tyrrell's texts. L. 839 is the crux. The MSS. vary in attributing the *non est* either to Thais or to Pythias. For *non est tum* Fleckeisen and Wagner read *tum autem*, which has the merit of meaning something at least. But there is a well-defined type of comic sentence which can easily be extricated from beneath the débris of *non est tum*. Fabia quotes two examples in his note—